Initially, the crowds of migrant workers were rapidly absorbed by the need for labour (Fonseca 1999) ; however the process of industrialisation and consequent population increase in Diadema was accompanied by intense, fast, chaotic, and uneven occupation of the territory, typical of the periphery in the metropolitan region of São Paulo. The arrival of workers and the occupation of the urban area increased faster than the development of urban infrastructure and public services. Until 1950, Diadema had few occupied areas, with only a few brick yards and residences. The process of urban occupation was swift starting in the 1960s, and accelerating in the 1970s and 1980s, with the arrival of migrants attracted by local and regional job opportunities.
Diadema was an attractive location, neighbouring São Paulo and the industrialised cities of the Great ABC. While Diadema offered the prospect of cheap land, this was informal, lacked infrastructure and was at risk from floods and landslides. Diadema became a dormitory district where workers from neighbouring municipalities resided.
In 1958, the district separated from the municipality of São Bernardo do Campo.
1 Several industries established in Diadema absorbed local labour, and the city lost the stigma of being a dormitory city. Industrial development was strengthened in 1971 with the construction of the Imigrantes Highway, which improved access to the important port of Santos. Low-income workers involved in the construction of the Imigrantes Highway stayed on with their families, contributing to housing pressures. The population grew across the Great ABC by 96 per cent during 1960-70, with the increase concentrated in Diadema, where the population rose from 12,308 to 79,316, an increase of 544 per cent over the decade. In that same period, the number of industrial workers increased from 632 to 9,622 -a 1,422 per cent increase. Provision of urban infrastructure and essential public services did not increase in line with this population growth, resulting in illegal/irregular lots, slums, and other informal settlements with poor housing and deprived of basic urban infrastructure (Coelho 2008) ; the area 'acquired a low-income population and a do-it-yourself housing production' pattern of development (Rolnik 1998).
Many social movements, workers unions and even the Labour Party (PT) originated in this region. Conflicts and social inequalities during the economic growth and industrialisation of the Great ABC, particularly during the second half of the twentieth century, were characterised by workers' struggles for better wages and working conditions, as well as decent housing. While in the midst of the military dictatorship, social movements and regional workers' unions organised by the Church Base Communities (CEBS) began to be noticed in the regional and national scene: metalworkers struck in the late 1970s, and there were proposals for alternative governance in response to the absence of social policies from the military government (Baltrusis and Mourad 1999) . Social struggles in factories and slums in the region were linked because most workers and their families lived in these areas, and lacked access to land, suitable homes, and basic urban services and infrastructure. According to interviews with housing movement leaders Cida and Toninho, 2 the struggle for decent housing was always connected to the trade union movement, which cooperates to this day in carrying out public demonstrations, marches, and disseminating reports, among other activities. In the 1980s, the end of the military regime and the challenges of global economic recession and transformation in the region placed these social forces on the sociopolitical stage in the redemocratisation period that led up to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.
The principles that guided the 22 years of experience with housing struggles in Diadema under the Workers' Party (PT) administration were enshrined in the 1988 Constitution, which included the social function of urban property and the right to decent housing in 'The City Statute' (a federal law regulating the constitutional chapter on national urban policy), and Federal Law 11124/2004, establishing the National System and Fund for Housing of Social Interest. We could say that the experiences in Diadema anticipated principles, guidelines, and major goals of the new urban and housing policies of the current decade.
2 Urbanisation and housing policies in Diadema: participation and democratisation of public policy decision-making Re-democratisation in Brazil was strongly associated with decentralisation. With the progressive 1988 Constitution, municipalities gained administrative and legislative autonomy from States and the Federal government, and became the tier of government closest to the people, allowing for greater citizen participation in local governance affairs. The relationship between the PT and the social movements and trade unions set the stage for their victory in the 1982 Diadema's municipal elections, winning them their first chance at local government, with the country still under military dictatorship. The PT won again in 1988, with the end of the military regime and direct elections, and again in 1992. In 1996, the PT supported the Brazilian Social Party (PSB), whose candidate, Gilson de Menezes, had already been Mayor of Diadema, and who had recently changed parties. The 1996-2000 PSB government was criticised for scaling back social policy initiatives, including social housing policies that were the centrepiece of the PT government. In 2000 In , 2004 In and 2008 , the PT were again re-elected until 2012, at which time the PT will have had 26 years in government in Diadema. The Labour Party has not ruled any Brazilian city for the same length of time.
The origins of the PT and its links within social movements and trade unions made citizen participation a principle of the PT administrations in Diadema as well as across the country, including with respect to the working class living in precarious and informal areas. According to Ronaldo Lacerda, 3 a leader in the movement for decent housing, the mobilisation of these classes, especially women, started with the urgent needs of families living without water, sewage, paving, electricity, healthcare, schools and other urban services. Besides the needs of existing neighbourhoods, there was a demand for new housing for homeless families or others living in excessively dense, unsanitary and highrisk areas. In all, there were three key dimensions to the urban and housing policies of the PT administrations in Diadema: FUMAPIS was established in 1990, 4 evolving from a committee of slum residents and associations fighting for adequate housing. The members, five municipal administration representatives, five community members, and one City Council member monitor and decide on the use of FUMAPIS resources. This new channel for social participation opened a democratic space for dialogue between the authorities and society, and brought together groups and social movements previously excluded from policy processes. It pre-dated national instruments for urban reform and social interest housing through the National Social Interest Housing System (SNHIS) and the National Social Interest Housing Fund (FNHIS) in 2005, which define federal responsibilities for planning, councils, and housing funds.
The power of deliberating over the use of FUMAPIS resources meant this Council became a strategic participatory space for local society. Council member elections were closely contested, as this forum sets policy priorities and allocates housing budgets for the entire city. A Legal Aid Service programme was also in place during 1989-92 to strengthen citizen participation in FUMAPIS by supporting organisation-building among resident groups and associations. This was important because representatives of society who desire to occupy a seat in the Council must be bound to a legally constituted association of residents. The Legal Aid Service helped the first organised associations to become involved in processes of urbanisation and land title regularisation of slums. New regional housing movement associations were also formed in the North, South, East and West parts of the city, further encouraging local participation. Together with other social movements, the popular struggle for decent housing was staged at both state and national levels, in the Popular Movements Central and the National Union of Popular Movement meetings.
In the non-PT ruling period of the late 1990s, local government sought to eliminate democratic spaces, suspending FUMAPIS meetings, and putting a break on social policies. The housing associations organised to defend FUMAPIS on grounds of democratic management, including adopting a range of direct political strategies such as occupation of idle land and warehouses in 1998, to pressure government to maintain housing policies negotiated with popular movements.
In early 2001, with the return of a PT administration in Diadema, spaces for participation in housing policy discussions were reactivated. In 2005-06, three major housing programmes were legislated for, the Housing Assistance Programme, 5 the 'Tá Bonito' ('Looks Good') Programme, 6 and Support Programme for Associations Fighting for Housing. The administration resumed relationships with housing movement organisations, creating agreements and partnerships, including with the State Company for Housing and Urban Development (CDHU) and the federal bank, Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), and to fund Social Interest Housing Enterprises (EHIS).
7 Table 1 provides a summary account of key meetings, conferences and forums during which thematic/policy issues were debated and decided on during 1983-2008.
Slum urbanisation in Diadema
In the early 1980s, few Diadema streets were paved and few residents had access to the network of water, sewage and public lighting. During this period, just over half of all homes had access to city water, only 14 per cent were connected to the sewage system, and the infant mortality rate was high, at 83 per 1,000 live births. Slum urbanisation was an important site for the struggle for improved housing and against social-spatial segregation between rich and poor. It is interesting that rather than just meeting the specific demands of the residents, city experts talked about slum urbanisation as an integration of actions and services more broadly (Coelho 2008) . This was:
[V]irtually unknown at the time … a revolution, because it implied a complete transformation of the slum: to do away with a bunch of shacks, to open streets, install a network of underground pipes for water and electricity, leaving the surface for traffic of cars, ambulances, and so on. This went far beyond the expectations of people who wanted water and electricity. (Bisilliat 2004) The infrastructure built in the old slums helped improve other sectors such as health and public safety. Public health improved, and diseases associated with poor sanitation declined, such that the infant mortality rate dropped from 83 per thousand in 1983 to 15 per thousand in 2004. Urbanisation enabled the public appropriation of spaces that had previously been abandoned and poorly lit, inhibiting crime and violence in many areas. Children's school attendance was also believed to have improved, as school facilities were upgraded through the urbanisation process.
From the start, the municipal actors had explained that in order to have water and electricity it was necessary to urbanise first, which required organising, participating, electing a committee, studying the issues; matters of representation, authority and democratic processes all needed to be considered, with the city strongly encouraging self-organisation (Bisilliat 2004 ). Slum residents who had benefited from investments in land development and regularised land titles noted that the results went far beyond physical and urban improvements:
[T]his area was pure mud, we put plastic bags on our feet to leave the house to get to work. In rainy days we almost could not leave the house, the alleys were very steep and very slippery. (Interview with a nucleus resident of Jardim Maria Tereza)
The involvement of housing nucleuses created an awareness of residents' rights, at the expense of the more usual clientelistic relationships based on favours. It also generated a feeling of belonging and an impulse to care for their new legalised urban district. According to a resident of Jardim Maria Tereza, 'before we could not and did not want to invest in our home. The truck with construction material could not get here. After the urbanisation, yes, we improved our homes'.
From the beginning, public managers opted for a gradual urbanisation process, focusing on gradual improvements for the majority rather than fully urbanising some 'model' nucleuses in pilot projects. The process was slow, and proceeded over several administrations through the establishment of piped water, sewage, electricity, paving, and access to main roads (Coelho 2008) . Given the lack of state and federal resources, these development projects were carried out in partnership with the residents in a system of mutual help (mutirão). It was observed, however, that after these numerous victories, a number of community leaders moved away from the struggle for decent housing, residents were demobilised, and some communities no longer have internal social organisations. As a result, local government technicians and social movement leaders have attempted, throughout the years to engage youth in these processes, as well as link decent housing struggles to other social policy areas that still require improvements.
These advances are due to the unusual continuity of actions and investments over 22 years of governments of the PT in the city. The demarcation of these slums as Special Areas of Social Interest 2 (AEIS 2) in the City Urban Development Plan of 1994, and the law of Use and Occupation of the Land in 1996, contributed to the continuity of the process that ensured those advances. This legislation provided for urban slums, demarcated as AEIS 2, to be subject to a plan of urbanisation and real estate regularisation.
Land title regularisation
Land title regularisation was introduced in the housing policy of Diadema by technical municipal managers, based on discussions with the housing movement, and in conjunction with the urbanisation process. The main instrument to legalise land use was the Grant for the Real Right of Use (CDRU) which 'aims to ensure the right of the people living in a slum located in public area ... it ensures the social use while the property remains public' (Mourad 2000). This instrument adopted by the city was following pressure from the executive branch and the residents of slums located in public areas, with a direct interest in regularising their land title. A new municipal law in 1985 was used to change the status of areas of common public use to the category of special use, allowing CDRU titles to be issued to residents but on a collective basis, with each resident receiving a title for a fraction of the public area.
In order to receive those titles, slums were to be urbanised or in the process of urbanisation, and to have associations and committees of residents (Reis and Liso 1998) . The linkage between land title regularisation and urbanisation of slums prevents this process from becoming a mere legalisation of poor urban conditions. Currently, municipal technicians work with communities to provide individual CDRU titles, although this work has been hindered by the fragmentation and disorganisation of some associations, such as Jardim Maria Tereza. One city technician suggested that this re-articulation around individual titles could help restructure communities and involve them in the fight for greater advances in urban and housing policies.
For years, the Grant for the Real Right of Use was used as the key instrument of land title regularisation of slums located in public areas, in Diadema and elsewhere. Since the approval of the City Urban Development Plan in 1994, municipal technicians increased the scope to include other forms of regularisation.
Property registration costs are high, creating an obstacle to registration for many legalised slums. Many residents of housing projects still do not have their documents officially recorded. To address this problem, the housing department has organised meetings with city registrars to explain that registration should be free of charge, and to try to help them solve bureaucratic obstacles.
Popular new housing through Special Areas of Social Interest 1 (AEIS 1)
Population density and the high number of cohabitant families are reflected in domestic household density. At present, household density is more of a problem than the lack of infrastructure. This situation is directly related to the scarcity of land for new housing in the city. The expansion of access to urban land for new houses can only happen with strategies to regulate the real estate market included in planning and territorial management processes. After years of investment in urbanisation and real estate regularisation of slums and illegal lots, the city began to strengthen important processes of territorial planning. In 1991, municipality technicians prepared a new draft for a City Urban Development Plan. Society was not involved in discussions of this proposal which was forwarded to the City Council without a constituted social base. The Bill was not approved by councillors.
The following administration emphasised the resumption of participation in the process of developing the City Urban Development Plan. The major conflict was to enable a supply of urban land for low-income housing. It emerged that the city had reserved the best and the most land for industrial use, while around one-third of the population were living on only 4 per cent of the city land (Carvalho et al. 2005) .
Two types of Special Areas of Social Interest (AEIS) were proposed. Special Areas of Social Interest 1 (AEIS 1) were vacant land in urban spaces providing services, facilities and urban infrastructure, which the creation of a reserve of land for the poorest, similar to previous zoning of land for industrial use (Carvalho et al. 2005) .
AEIS 1 were to provide new housing for lowincome people in demarcated land, enabling acquisition of property by popular movements, often with the mediation of City Hall, and construction of new housing. The transformation of empty spaces previously intended for industrial use in AEIS 1, expanded the space for HSI (Housing of Social Interest) and reduced, for a time, the price of land. After about two years, the demand from associations pushed land prices up again (Coelho 2008).
Special Areas of Social Interest 2 (AEIS 2) were demarcated in areas occupied by slums and illegal lots demanding urbanisation to improve living conditions and requiring regularisation. The objective of AEIS 2 was to integrate these informal settlements with the city and to ensure home ownership through official documentation.
The approval of AEIS 1 required an intensive process of training and negotiation. The popular housing movement initially viewed the instrument as a city land bank, and rejected the idea of buying the vacant land. Faced with this misunderstanding, the municipal technicians held workshops to explain that the idea of the land bank was extremely costly for the city as it would be necessary to carry out expropriations of high priced land beyond the investment capacity of the municipal government. In this way, city staff succeeded in convincing the housing movement that AEIS 1 was a viable means of meeting the housing demands of low-income people without cost to the municipality (Carvalho et al. 2005) . The criteria for inclusion of families in AEIS 1 housing were jointly defined as family income no higher than ten minimum salaries, no property owned, of fixed residence in the municipality and organised into legal associations.
Landowners and private business resisted the approval of the City Urban Development Plan, arguing that AEIS 1 would impede economic growth, as most demarcated areas were in the former industrial area. 'This group of people was supported by local political forces that proposed a substitute bill which would in essence half the implementation of AEIS; this was ultimately rejected in the face of popular pressure' (Carvalho et al. 2005) .
AEIS 1 allowed housing associations to negotiate the purchase of land and lots with their owners, with the city mediating negotiations. Over 300,000 square metres of land were bought in this way during 1994-5, to become housing for 2,842 families. The city expropriated some 174,000 square metres to house people living in areas at risk and those who had to leave urbanised slums because of road building, hazardous and unsanitary conditions (Bisilliat 2004 ). The local government was responsible for the installation of infrastructure in the housing projects, such as paving, water network, sewage and electricity. In 2006, AEIS 1 had received 40 requests for social interest housing projects, with a total of 8,862 housing units. With the increased housing supply under AEIS 1, the growth of slums and illegal land subdivisions in areas at risk and of environmental interest has slowed, including around rivers and water sources. This was an important achievement, as in neighbouring municipalities irregular precarious urban occupation has advanced along rivers, streams and the banks of major water reservoirs supplying the city.
One of the areas included in AEIS 1, negotiated in partnership between the housing movement and City Hall, involved 100,000 square metres of land belonging to industries. These areas were purchased with funds from the state government Company of Urban and Housing Development (CDHU), the municipality, and associations for fair housing. The housing associations involved promoted the construction of housing projects with resources from CDHU, while the city built the urban infrastructure and paid some of the value of the land. A total of 1,500 housing units were built, including through mutual aid and self-management, over a period of ten years, ending in 2005. There were moments during this process that demonstrated the importance and power of popular participation, including when in 1998 the CDHU did not release the funds to build the housing units, the associations camped in front of the company headquarters. With this pressure, and the help of the City Hall and State deputies, the funds were released. The slow release of these funds delayed the construction of new housing units. The last units were delivered in October 2008.
The housing projects are not yet fully ready. Some public equipment is missing and the creation of a public green area, claimed by residents, is not ready. However, it should be noted that even without these facilities, residents are provided with schools and health clinics, at a level found in surrounding neighbourhoods. The implementation of AEIS 1 housing projects has played a key role in the development of their areas, attracting commerce, services and other types of urban activities that improve the quality of collective life.
Talking to some residents of these housing projects, it becomes clear how access to decent housing in appropriate locations has improved their lives. The first change mentioned was the relief caused by the eliminating rent expenditure, which has helped to better meet basic needs. Moreover, dignified housing has provided them with official addresses. According to Manuel, a resident of Jardim das Praias, having an official address increases self-esteem, contributes to a feeling of belonging, and helps in obtaining better jobs. This enables children to attain a better and higher level of education as well as better living conditions.
Even within AEIS 1, empty urban spaces were the object of dispute between different interest groups around the allocation of land to different social and economic uses. Despite great successes where urban land was used for the construction of new good quality housing projects, integrated with the city, and delivered to low-income families, there were also cases where the land was appropriated for the middle-class real estate market. This deviation from the goals of AEIS 1 was caused by faults in the licensing of new real estate and control by the city in the late 1990s. During this period, investment in housing declined, slum urbanisation stopped, past infrastructure works deteriorated, channels of participation were closed, and there was an increase in the number of land occupations by organised movements, as strategies of political pressure for democratic public policies guaranteeing the right to a city and to decent housing.
Over that period, the Municipal Housing Department was abolished and its administrative and operational structure moved to the Municipal Public Works Department. Housing policy, and therefore slum urbanisation and housing projects in AEIS 1, moved to this department, becoming almost stagnant. In this context, city technicians reviewed the 1994 City Urban Development Plan, without the participation of the population. According to Ronaldo Lacerda, 'the (popular) movement was excluded from all processes, the participatory budgeting, and discussions of the City Urban Development Plan'. A new master plan was approved in 1998, with a more pragmatic stance on AEIS 1 and 2, including defining new parameters and perimeters against the promotion of social interest housing. These parameters allowed the deployment of other types of enterprises in these areas with more dense and intense occupation of urban land.
After this setback, the PT returned to local government, from 2001. The Municipal Housing Department was reinstated, slum urbanisation and channels of popular participation were restored. In 2002 and 2008, there were two revisions of the City Urban Development Plan. Both featured a return to the tradition of linking housing policy with other social policies, especially in integrating land policy and regulatory actions. The revision of the City Urban Development Plan in 2002 had the task of incorporating the tools of urban policy contained in the Federal City Statute (Brazilian Federal Government National Congress 2002) . For Carvalho, the review had to address the problem of the lack of empty spaces, as most AEIS 1 had been occupied and the region was under acute pressure for popular housing, real estate development, for industrial and economic use, and for green area spaces for leisure (Carvalho et al. 2005) .
The revision of the City Urban Development Plan opened many channels for popular participation in the discussions of city problems. However, this participation did not reach the expectations of the technical team working with the review, 8 as a result of the great quantity and fragmentation of discussion spaces and participatory processes, overloading the agenda of local leaders.
6 The future of the Diadema housing movement
In the last revision of the City Urban Development Plan in 2008, the main concerns related to socioeconomic regional and municipal development. According to one technician in the Municipal Housing Department, this concern is fundamental for the promotion of local development to generate employment and income, linked with efforts to reduce the constantly growing housing deficit in the city. For leaders Cida, Toninho, and Ronaldo, 9 the housing movement is also addressing the issue of integration of housing policy with other social policies such as health, education, economic development, and public safety. The need for linkage between these and other social policies is increasingly important in the daily life of communities. According to Ronaldo Lacerda, the option of resuming the discussions on housing policy, integrated with other needs, is also a way of strengthening the struggle for social housing, involving social groups that have already achieved their own home and need to mobilise to improve the living conditions in the neighbourhoods where they live. According to another technician at the Municipal Housing Department, 'when they (the militants of the popular movements) got to their lots and built their homes, participation ceased (in some cases). They could not see that the struggle continues, they had to obtain Basic Health Units (UBS), daycare centers, among other things'.
In some residential nucleuses such as the Jardim das Praias, the resident's association or the nucleus commission are still encouraging community participation, reinforcing the struggle in other areas such as education, health, sports, leisure, and cultures. According to Ronaldo Lacerda, the movement needs to involve the community in this fight in order to stimulate the formation of new leaders, involving young people to participate in policy discussions and actions towards demanding their interests. It is important for social groups to work this agenda of integration among different sectors of public policy. It is very important for these groups to seek the integration of channels and spaces of social participation. Only then can you pressure public power and guide them to truly intersectoral experiences. 
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